Do Sanctions Work—Or Are We Using Them Wrong?

In the post-globalization era, economic instruments have emerged as the primary means through which states assert power, impose costs, and reshape adversarial behavior. The use of sanctions, export controls, and financial restrictions has moved from the periphery of national security policy to its strategic core. No longer limited to slow-moving embargoes or symbolic restrictions, these tools now operate through a more surgical and potent mechanism: the control of chokepoints. The durability and legitimacy of this coercive architecture, however, depend less on its legal reach and more on its strategic clarity, institutional design, and long-term adaptability.

The Strategic Logic of Chokepoints

Modern economic coercion is increasingly defined by a shift from broad-based denial to selective leverage. At the center of this evolution is the use of chokepoints—critical nodes in the global economic system where one actor holds a structural advantage and alternatives are scarce or costly. These may include the global dollar-clearing infrastructure, advanced semiconductor design tools, or key components in energy and digital supply chains. When properly identified and enforced, chokepoints allow a state to impose asymmetric pressure with minimal overt force. Unlike traditional trade restrictions, chokepoint-based measures shape not only access to markets but the underlying operating conditions of the global economy.

The effectiveness of such leverage, however, is not inherent. It must be activated through timing, credibility, and the ability to escalate. Control over chokepoints provides the capacity for power projection, but not its automatic realization. The decision of whether, how, and when to weaponize these pressure points remains deeply political—and increasingly contested.

Strategic Ambiguity and the Limits of Incremental Pressure

The dominant critique of contemporary economic coercion is not that it lacks force, but that it lacks strategy. In several recent sanction regimes, pressure has been applied incrementally, hesitantly, or without a clear articulation of end goals. Sanctions designed to punish are often confused with those intended to deter, coerce, or degrade capacity. The result is a fragmented application of tools, where escalation unfolds slowly, enforcement remains partial, and adversaries retain room to adapt, regroup, or reorient trade.

The logic of "cost imposition" has, in practice, too often translated into calibrated discomfort rather than decisive disruption. Economic measures deployed in this mode may succeed in raising operational friction but fail to meaningfully constrain strategic behavior. Without the credible threat of escalation or an unambiguous threshold for relief, sanctions risk becoming background noise in the calculations of targeted regimes.

The Bureaucratic Architecture of Economic Power

The inconsistent application of coercive tools is not only a product of political will but of institutional design. Economic warfare lacks a consolidated command structure within most governments. The division of authority between finance, foreign affairs, commerce, and intelligence agencies creates procedural bottlenecks and divergent priorities. In many cases, capacity remains siloed. Treasury departments often lead on financial enforcement, but export controls, trade diplomacy, and strategic technology regulation are managed elsewhere—frequently without shared operational doctrine.

This fragmentation places a premium on individual initiative, creating a system that is reactive rather than anticipatory. While specific tools may be legally robust, their strategic integration is frequently improvised. In the absence of long-term planning, scenario modeling, and coherent escalation frameworks, the full potential of chokepoint leverage remains underutilized.

Enforcement and the Culture of Compliance

Sanctions regimes depend not only on government design but on private sector implementation. In financial sectors, decades of oversight have produced relatively strong cultures of compliance. In contrast, enforcement in technology, manufacturing, and energy sectors remains uneven. Many firms lack the expertise, incentives, or perceived risk necessary to enforce sanctions obligations with rigor. This discrepancy allows for regulatory arbitrage, particularly in jurisdictions that are not fully aligned with enforcement efforts.

The broader consequence is that sanctions are increasingly subject to circumvention through informal networks, alternative financing channels, and reconfigured supply chains. Without credible penalties—particularly against major violators—deterrence diminishes. Adversaries observe not only what is targeted but what is left untouched, and calibrate their behavior accordingly.

The Multilateral Challenge

The rise of economic coercion has outpaced the creation of multilateral enforcement infrastructure. While coordination among key allies is often achieved during moments of crisis, no permanent alliance or governing body exists to manage sanctions in a sustained, rules-based manner. As economic warfare becomes more central to great power competition, this absence becomes more acute.

Unilateral actions may deliver immediate leverage, especially when chokepoints are concentrated, but over time they risk incentivizing systemic exit. States and firms begin to invest in redundancy, localization, and parallel systems—not simply to defy coercion but to insure against its unpredictability. Without a shared framework for legitimacy and restraint, the very tools that underpin U.S. and allied advantage may become catalysts for fragmentation.

The Time Horizon and the Risk of Erosion

The strategic utility of chokepoints is finite. As rivals deepen cooperation, invest in domestic alternatives, and deploy digital currencies or independent financial rails, the structural dominance of existing chokepoints will erode. The U.S. dollar’s centrality, the dominance of Western semiconductor firms, and the concentration of critical minerals are all being actively contested. In many areas—such as green energy technologies—adversaries now control chokepoints of their own.

The decisive factor will not be the permanence of advantage but the speed of adaptation. States that treat economic statecraft as a temporary extension of diplomacy, rather than a permanent domain of competition, will fall behind. The window to entrench norms, harden enforcement, and modernize coercive infrastructure is narrowing.

Conclusion

Chokepoint-based economic warfare offers unmatched strategic leverage—but only when wielded with clarity, coherence, and resolve. The tools exist. The legal authorities are in place. What remains is the task of building institutions that match the scale and complexity of the challenge. Economic power, like military force, must be governed by doctrine, exercised through structure, and sustained by credibility. Without these, leverage fades—and with it, the ability to shape the global order.

Sources

• Atlantic Council. 2025. The age of economic warfare: Behind US sanctions against Russia, China, and Iran. Atlantic Council. March 18.

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